Euthanasia – is there a case? by Clarke, D.L & Egan, A
The traditional role of the physician has been to preserve human 
life. However, we have now reached a stage where physicians 
are often accused of preserving human life long after life itself has 
become a burden to the person living it. Throughout the developed 
world the demand for the legalisation of the right to end life is in-
creasingly heard. This is referred to as euthanasia or mercy killing. 
Euthanasia means ‘A good death’ in Greek and covers a number 
of separate but interrelated issues. This paper attempts to place 
the euthanasia debate in context and to highlight both areas of 
consensus and of contention. 
The following proposed definitions are intended to assist in the 
discussion.1-9
Voluntary euthanasia is a conscious decision made by an 
individual that his/her life is actually no longer good for him/her 
and that death is more desirable.
Involuntary euthanasia is a decision made by a third party on 
behalf of a person who is no longer in a position to make one that 
his/her life is burdensome and that death is more desirable.
Physician-assisted suicide (PAS) recognises the fact that in-
dividuals who wish to end their life may be physically incapable of 
performing the act and may need assistance in the process. 
Active euthanasia and passive euthanasia may be regarded as 
direct killing, as opposed to allowing someone to die. 
What does religion say about 
euthanasia?
There is broad consensus across religious beliefs that it is wrong 
to kill an innocent human being. It is usually stated there is an in-
herent sanctity about all human life as each life belongs to God.1-8 
Killing of the innocent, suicide and euthanasia have been consid-
ered deserving of moral opprobrium. This position has been well 
documented by the scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas. He 
condemned suicide for the following reasons. 
•   It violates one's natural desire to live. 
•   It harms other people.
•   Life is the gift of God and is therefore only to be taken by God.
However, there are grey areas in the religious objection to 
suicide. Religious moralists distinguish between ordinary and ex-
traordinary methods of supporting a life. To withdraw an ordinary 
therapy is considered wrong, but a physician is under no moral 
obligation to continue with an extraordinary means of supporting a 
life. The other theory that is often used in religious-based medical 
ethics is the principle of double effect. This states that while it is 
wrong to commit a bad act, a good act is good in itself. If a good 
act has unintended bad consequences, then the person perform-
ing the act is not morally blameworthy for those consequences. 
This was used to justify the administration of high doses of opioids 
in patients suffering from advanced cancer, who were in extreme 
pain. The religious prohibition on mercy killing is nuanced and not 
absolute.
Modern secular medical ethics
The traditional Hippocratic Oath was explicit that the role of a phy-
sician was to preserve human life and not to be instrumental in its 
destruction.1-3 The oath stated ‘To please no one will I prescribe 
a deadly drug nor give advice which may cause his death.’ ‘Pri-
mum non nocere’ is another famous adage that warns doctors at 
all costs not to harm their patients. These traditional concepts are 
opposed to the killing of a human being. Modern secular medical 
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ethics rests on four principles: autonomy, beneficence, non-ma-
leficence and justice.1-3 However, these principles may come into 
conflict. 
Why would someone want to die?
People want to kill themselves for many reasons. The common-
est cause of suicide remains clinical depression. Suicide in these 
patients must be seen as a tragedy. There are other reasons that 
may prompt a person to feel that life is intolerable. An individual 
may be in a state of chronic and excessive pain. A terminal and 
chronic illness may result in excessive medical expenses which 
will deplete financial resources available for the surviving relatives 
without significantly improving the quality of life for the patient. In 
some patients a serious disease may adversely affect the quality 
of life of an individual to the point where he/she no longer wishes 
to continue living. Neurological diseases are especially feared as 
they lead to a loss of autonomy. The philosopher Charles Taylor 
in his monograph The Ethics of Authenticity points out that in the 
modern era the issue of personal choice has come to be seen as 
central to our authenticity as human beings.10 We value our ability 
to choose and control all aspects of our life including the end of our 
life. It is regarded as a truism that we live in a multi-cultural world 
where different cultural viewpoints compete in an open market of 
ideas. Is it possible to establish a moral consensus for supporting 
or rejecting the different forms of euthanasia?
Voluntary euthanasia
It is generally considered morally praiseworthy to prevent a suicide 
if one is not certain of the motive or state of mind of the suicide 
victim. However, in the case of a person who has come to this 
decision with a clear mind the situation if different. The current 
emphasis on autonomy and self-determination would suggest that 
a person’s autonomous decision to end his/her life should be re-
spected. Refusing potentially life-saving surgery is a form of volun-
tary euthanasia and is easy to comply with. There is a movement 
for people to make their autonomous wishes regarding the end 
of their life known while they are competent. This so-called ad-
vanced directive is of uncertain legal standing. It is also common 
for many people not to think ahead about unpleasant issues such 
as death and disability. The British Medical Journal has published 
guidelines on assessing competence of a decision in the elderly 
to refuse therapy.11 A patient must understand the condition, prog-
nosis, and proposed therapy, and be able to reason consistently 
and to act on the basis of such reasoning. A patient must be able 
to communicate their choice and the reasons for that choice and 
understand the practical consequences of their choice. There is 
very little guidance about patients who seek active euthanasia. If 
a patient wishes to actively end his/her life, the physician is under 
no obligation to assist with this and in fact runs the risk of legal 
sanction if he/she does assist. This is a somewhat anomalous situ-
ation as it appears that we are discriminating between methods of 
choosing death. 
Involuntary euthanasia
Often the question of euthanasia arises when an individual is not 
capable of making a decision and the decision is referred to sur-
rogates. Usually a surrogate is a close relative or life partner of the 
individual concerned. The question asked is what would that indi-
vidual have wanted if he/she were competent to make a decision? 
This is always difficult, as being related does not imply intimacy, 
and often the topic of death and disability might never have come 
up in conversation. There are examples of surrogates getting it 
wrong or forcefully imposing their wishes on the patient. Jennifer 
Allwood thought it would be merciful to smother her 67-year-old 
father who had cancer. He was able to fight back and survived.12 
It is important that the relationship of trust between a doctor and 
patient be maintained. A feeling on the patient’s part that a doctor 
may also become an executioner may undermine this trust. There 
is undoubted pressure on medical professionals to conserve re-
sources. Who is the physician responsible to, the patient with 
whom he already has a fiduciary relationship or a theoretical future 
patient who he does not yet have a relationship with? The princi-
ples of medical ethics may come into conflict with each other. 
Passive euthanasia
Passive euthanasia is accepted and in reality is widely practised. 
It is often called withdrawal of therapy. If further care is unlikely to 
be of any therapeutic benefit, a physician is not obliged to continue 
therapy. The current approach is for a physician to declare that 
future therapy is futile and then to withdraw therapy on the basis 
of futility.11,13 Experienced physicians can read the writing on the 
wall when it comes to outcome in many situations. However, this 
approach has been accused of bringing back old-fashioned pater-
nalism. Pro-life pressure groups have begun to show interest in 
how these decisions are made and communicated to the patients 
and relatives. Issues of distributive justice in the form of resource 
constraints may influence the definition of futility. In a country with 
a well-developed social health care system a patient with renal 
failure would receive life-sustaining renal dialysis therapy. How-
ever, in a developing country a patient with a similar disease and 
demographic profile may not have access to dialysis. So defini-
tions of futility may change depending on circumstance. Medical 
decisions about futility can expect more intense scrutiny in the fu-
ture. In the case of children with significant deformities that require 
specialised care it is important for the physician to understand that 
his/her patient is the child, not the parents. The physician should 
be motivated by the child’s best interests, not those of the par-
ents.14-16 The following British legal precedents are relevant to the 
discussion. In 1981 Baby B was born with Down syndrome and in-
testinal atresia. The parents refused to consent to the surgery and 
stated that they wished the baby to die as its quality of life would 
be poor. A lower court judge ruled in favour of the parents.17 The 
hospital appealed and the decision was reversed, as it is gener-
ally accepted that a child with Down syndrome can experience a 
good quality of life. A landmark ruling was the 1993 Bland case.6,17 
Anthony Bland was left in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) after 
being crushed during the Hillsborough Football Stadium disaster 
in 1989. Four years later his parents and the hospital trust suc-
cessfully sought permission from the High Court and the House 
of Lords to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration. Both courts 
agreed. Peter Singer has described this judgment as courageous 
and marking a ‘seismic shift against the concept of sanctity of life’. 
The Law Lords stated that the continuing maintenance of Bland’s 
physiology was of no benefit to him.6 
Higher functions are controlled by the cerebral cortex. Lower 
functions are maintained in the brainstem. Almost all countries 
have accepted evidence of brainstem death as evidence of death 
of the person. However in the case of cortical dysfunction the pa-
tient is considered to be in a PVS and cannot be declared dead. 
They may well remain in this condition for many years. There are 
some moralists who would argue that without higher cortical func-
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tion a person in a PVS is dead and that all that remains is a physi-
cal organism. Authors such as Singer and McMahan would have 
no moral objection to withdrawing the feeding tube and would have 
no objection to actively killing a patient in a PVS.5,6
Terry Schiavo’s husband wished to have her feeding tube re-
moved and for her to be allowed to die. Her parents felt that this 
was morally wrong and not in keeping with Terry’s own wishes.18,19 
The prolonged legal struggle eventually resulted in the tube be-
ing removed and in Terry’s death. The debates revolved around 
a number of issues. The argument in favour of removing a feed-
ing tube would state that we did not intend to kill the patient by 
removing a tube which was causing her discomfort and a loss of 
dignity. The fact that she was unable to maintain nutrition and died 
from dehydration was a foreseen but unintended consequence of 
removing the tube. The other issue was that of ordinary versus 
extraordinary therapies. Some treatments such as mechanical 
ventilation, home-based intravenous nutrition and renal haemo- 
dialysis are expensive but no longer experimental. Are they still to 
be considered extraordinary therapies? Christopher Reeves sur-
vived for several years following a high spinal cord injury.20 The 
therapy required to do this was extremely expensive and complex. 
It is doubtful whether a quadriplegic patient in the developing world 
would have access to this care. The definition of ordinary and ex-
traordinary depends on social class and geographical location. A 
‘one size fits all’ approach to morality may not be possible in the 
modern world.
Active euthanasia
Although there is much acceptance of passive euthanasia there 
are areas of contention within it. There are three arguments in fa-
vour of active euthanasia. They are the relief of intractable pain, 
the respect for autonomy and the closely related fear of a loss of 
dignity that accompanies the loss of autonomy. The widespread 
acceptance of autonomy and respect for individual choice when 
it comes to passive euthanasia has caused many to question the 
basis for the moral and legal objection to active euthanasia. Inter-
nationally there has been a movement towards legalising active 
euthanasia. Several bioethicists distinguish between justified and 
unjustified PAS. Beauchamp and Childress can see no moral ob-
jection to prevent an autonomous individual from requesting help 
with ending his/her life and they can see nothing morally wrong 
with a physician assisting the aforesaid individual.2 They feel that 
frustrating an individual to achieve his/her objective is morally 
wrong. It will result in a loss of dignity and in despair. In this case 
causing death is not an evil act. However they are quick to qualify 
this by pointing out that unjustified PAS is a problem. The case of 
Dr Kevorkian is described.2 The general consensus is that he had 
no doctor-patient relationship with his victims, had not established 
their diagnoses adequately and acted with indecent haste. How-
ever, they point to cases such as that of McAfee, a quadriplegic 
man who wanted to end his life by disconnecting himself from his 
ventilator. This was in keeping with his right to refuse treatment; 
however he required the administration of a sedative to control the 
pain while he disconnected himself from the ventilator. The court 
used the principle of double effect to get around this by stating that 
the administration of sedation was part of the medical therapy de-
signed to control his pain. Beauchamp and Childress believe that 
assisted suicide is justified under strict conditions.
Although this would seem to indicate consensus among secu-
lar bioethicists, there are several objections. Is anyone ever re-
ally totally autonomous, or do the social relations influence our 
decisions? Are we ever able to properly assess autonomy? The 
argument about intractable pain is controversial as modern pain 
therapy is increasingly effective. The loss of dignity argument is 
a strong one and appeals to secular society as autonomy is so 
highly valued. Many religious and secular moralists have serious 
objections to active voluntary euthanasia. These have been high-
lighted, but it is perhaps unjustified for these views to be imposed 
on secular society as a whole. Especially in the case where there 
is an autonomous decision made for suicide, we should not frus-
trate the wishes of a competent human being. The situation of in-
voluntary euthanasia is much more of a concern as there is no 
autonomy and we need to err on the side of protecting those who 
cannot speak for themselves. There are concerns that may well 
become more central as objections to the widespread adoption 
of active euthanasia. These are the so-called slippery slope argu-
ment and the centrality of the doctor-patient relationship.
The slippery slope argument
This is a well-used argument by opponents of abortion and eutha-
nasia. Opponents refer to the history of the mid-20th century. The 
argument is that a move to unsanctify human life resulted in the 
rise of utilitarianism. This may result in the minority and the weak 
being left behind. The examples of this approach were the Nazis 
and the eugenicists. The American eugenicists were interested in 
eliminating mental retardation.1-3 There was a strong element of 
racism in this as they were often concerned that decreased fertil-
ity in Americans of Protestant stock would result in demographics 
changing as immigration of poor Catholics continued unchecked. 
The Nazi programme of active involuntary euthanasia targeted 
mentally incapacitated children. They were referred to as life un-
worthy of life. Now, is it a simple case of scaremongering by the 
pro-life lobby? There may well be an element of this. There is no 
evidence in places like Holland that there has been an upsurge in 
euthanasia for racist reasons. However there are valid concerns. 
Will elderly disabled people be encouraged to ask for active eu-
thanasia by a society that is weary of paying the cost to support 
them? The impending demographic crisis in Europe is real.21 In-
creased longevity and falling birth rates have resulted in an in-
verted demographic triangle. Will it not be cheaper to euthanise 
the elderly? Non-treatment on the basis of old age has been used 
unacceptably as a mechanism for rationing scarce resources.22,23 
There have been well-publicised murder trials involving health 
care professionals who have been guilty of murdering a number 
of elderly patients by lethal injection.24  These are the actions of 
psychopathic personalities, but do they reflect an underlying social 
perspective? So the slippery slope argument cannot be dismissed 
out of hand as scaremongering. The pro-life lobby quotes as an 
example of the slippery slope the extension of active euthanasia 
to neonates with severe congenital deformities in the Nether-
lands. In 2005, the Groningen Protocol was published setting out 
the circumstances under which doctors could kill a neonate with 
severe and untreatable pathology.25-27  The protocol established 
three categories: those neonates with no chance of survival; those 
who after intensive treatment face a very grim future with severe 
problems; and a third group who are not dependent on intensive 
medical treatment and who may survive for many years, even into 
adulthood. Pro-life groups claim that this would amount to pre-
emptive killing.
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The doctor-patient relationship and 
euthanasia
Despite the ongoing commercialisation of society, medicine re-
tains a proud standing as a traditional profession. Most health care 
workers would describe medicine as a vocation or calling rather 
than a mere career. Doctors want to preserve life and alleviate 
suffering. Alleviating suffering by ending life has never been part of 
the medical professional code. Legalising euthanasia will change 
this. It is unclear how this will change the profession, but it is a real 
concern. The widespread adoption of professionalism in sport has 
improved performance in the sporting codes. However, there is 
evidence that professionalism has resulted in fewer people playing 
amateur sport. Amateur sport was supposed to teach sportsman-
ship and encourage a healthy lifestyle. Now it would seem that it 
is only there for the children of talent. It is very difficult to predict 
the long-term ramifications of legalising euthanasia on the doctor-
patient relationship, but we are deluding ourselves if we think that 
it will not have long-term unexpected consequences. Physicians 
are expressly concerned with the most vulnerable groups in soci-
ety. Physicians have traditionally been regarded as advocates for 
these groups. If we introduce active euthanasia we would lose our 
status as defenders of the weak. 
The role of conscience
Aquinas believed that a formed and informed conscience could 
not be lightly overridden. We are all capable of moral reasoning 
and once we have reached a moral belief we should try to fulfil 
our belief. Throughout history following one’s conscience has cost 
individuals dearly. It would be wrong for law makers to attempt to 
prescribe behaviour of individual doctors. It will be important for 
the right to conscience to be respected if legislation to legalise 
euthanasia is propagated in South Africa.
What is so sacred about human life?
Religion has always maintained that human beings are created in 
the image of God and that human life is sacred. This belief is no 
longer accepted absolutely by secular society. One of the most 
eloquent critics of this belief is Peter Singer.6 He believes that life 
is only of value if it is possessed by a sentient creature that can 
feel pain and has expectations of a future. Singer would regard a 
person such as Terri Schiavo, who suffered extensive destruction 
of her cerebral cortex, as a non-person as she could no longer 
experience the world or look forward to a future. Jeff McMahan in 
The Ethics of Killing states that the best way to think of human be-
ings is as ‘embodied minds’.5 For Singer and McMahan, once your 
higher cerebral functions have been lost you are a non-person.5,6 
The conclusions of these speculations are radical. Singer and Mc-
Mahan would probably have gone further with Terri Schiavo. They 
would have supported actively killing her by removing her organs 
and transplanting them. They would argue that Terri Schiavo was 
long dead; all that remained was her body. Removing her organs 
would not have harmed her and may have benefited several other 
patients who needed her organs. 
Conclusion
Euthanasia is controversial. The right to refuse treatment is well 
accepted. When it comes to withdrawing treatment there is con-
sensus that provided therapy is futile then there is no moral cen-
sure. However, there are issues around the exact definition of futile 
care. The definition may unfortunately be dependent on resource 
constraints. Passive euthanasia when it is involuntary is also con-
troversial as the autonomy of the individual is not respected. This 
may be impossible in cases where the individual is unlikely to ever 
regain autonomy. The principle of double effect and the distinc-
tion between ordinary and extraordinary means are also areas for 
discussion. Once again definitions are difficult as resource con-
straints as well as the spread of technology mean that what was 
once extraordinary may become routine in relatively short periods 
of time. Active euthanasia has become an issue in a society that 
values personal choice and control. While there are religious rea-
sons to reject active euthanasia, the secular reasoning appears to 
be compelling. There are however a number of practical concerns. 
Although the slippery slope argument is prone to hyperbole, there 
are valid concerns about how changing our position leads to real 
but often intangible changes in the relationship between physi-
cians and patients. Active involuntary euthanasia seems to be op-
posed by the vast majority. Despite a few radical voices it seems 
unlikely that it will garner mass acceptance.
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